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ABSTRACT
This paper is a response to the comments by A. Blomqvist and by M. Carter
on the Sah-Stiglit z paper "The Economics of Price Scissors" (AER, March 1984).
The commentator s contend that our model of a socialist economy is not an
appropriate vehicle for examining certain proposition s which the Soviet
economist Evgeny Preobrazhen sky advanced during the Soviet Debate. It turns
out, however, that the alternative specificatio ns suggested by the commentator s
belong to the class of models which we have developed to analyze the
consequence s of price scissors and of urban-rural pricing in the context of
today's (non-social ist) LDCs. In this paper we: (i) summarize some of the
results of our analysis which are relevant here and (ii) argue that the
commentator s have missed the cental aspects of the Soviet State and the Soviet
Industriali zation Debate, and that our original interpretat ion is correct.
(Forthcomin g, American Economic Review, December 1986.)

THE ECONOMICS OF TOWN-VERSUS-COUNTRY PROBLEMS*
Raaj Kumar Sah, Yale University
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Princeton University

The question of how the funds required for the capital accumulation asso
ciated with industrialization are to be raised has a long history.

Since the

industrial sector is relatively small in the early stages of industrialization,
there has been a presumption that funds must primarily come from the agricul
tural sector.

The issue has been how best to extract these funds, what are the

effects of such a resource transfer, what is the nature of the limits on the
amounts to be extracted, and whether, in this process, it is desirable or necessary to squeeze simultaneously the urban proletariat.
In a part of our 1984 paper in this Review, we presented a simple model of
a closed socialist economy in which the instruments at the disposal of the gov
ernment are the terms of trade (the relative price of the agricultural good in
terms of the industrial good) and the industrial wage, which we believe sheds
some light on these questions, particularly in the context of the Soviet indus
trialization debate.

This model is part of a larger research program, in which

we have examined similar questions in the context of economies under a variety
of trade regimes, with a variety of institutional structures, with and without
heterogeneity among individuals with in a sector, with and without the disag
gregation of commodities produced in each of the two sectors, with and without
migration, where the government has at its disposal other policy instruments,
where wages in the urban sector are determined in a variety of ways, and in
*Prepared for American Economic Review in response to comments by Blom
qvist (1985) and Carter (1985) on our 1984 paper on price scissors.
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which wages and prices may affect the productivity of workers.
examining a variety of economic structures is obvious:

The reason for

as the past experience

of economic development has shown, there is an enormous diversity in the
salient features of developing countries and in the set of policy instruments
that a government can or can not employ.

Among our objectives have been (i) to

examine a range of models emphasizing different sets of structural features, in
part to ascertain which features are central to answering the questions at
hand, and (ii) to develop general reduced form relationships to describe spe
cific parts of the economy (for instance, to represent the migration mechanism
and the urban wage determination), to show that the central results depend only
on the properties of these reduced form relationships.
The issues raised by the two commentators are primarily interpretative.
They contend that our simple model of a socialist economy is not an appropriate
vehicle for examining certain propositions which the Soviet economist Evgeny
Preobrazhensky advanced during the Soviet debate.

Instead, Michael Carter

argues for an open economy specification, and for a particular type of wage
productivity effect.

Ake Blomqvist, on the other hand, favors a specification

in which the government can set different prices in the two sectors (we have
referred to the problem of analyzing differential prices, or taxes, in the two
sectors as that of urban-rural pricing; in contrast to the price scissors prob
lem, where both sectors face the same prices).

As the commentators are aware,

we have analyzed these (and more general specifications) in our 1985a and 1983
papers respectively. Since it is not possible to present a full analysis within
this short reply, we briefly describe some of the qualitative features of price
scissors within a simple framework, so that one can see certain implications of
alternative assumptions:

We then turn to the more doctrinal and interpretative
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issues:

What did Preobrazhensky really mean?

Which model provides a better

description of the Soviet State at the time of the debate?

We remain convinced

that our original interpretation was correct.

I.

Price Scissors2

An Economy Closed at the Margin:

In an economy facing binding constraints

in external trade (and which cannot borrow against the future), a lowering of
the price of the rural good--which reduces the supply of rural surplus avail
able to the urban sector--must be accompanied by a lowering of the urban wage-
to reduce the demand for the rural good, and hence to balance the supply and
demand of the rural good.

Thus:

The terms of trade can not be altered if the

government can not (or does not) alter the urban wage.
If the urban wage is altered then, though urban workers benefit from the
lowered price of the rural good, the required reduction in their wage always
turns out to be sufficiently large that the urban workers end up being hurt
from a lowering of the terms of trade.

This result does not depend on the

direction (or volume) of external trade, or on the nature of the wage
productivity effects (that is, on the overall effect of a decrease in the price
of the rural good as well as in the urban wage on the net output of urban work
ers).

If wage productivity effects are not significant, then a lower urban

wage increases the investible surplus; therefore:
trade increases the investible surplus.
uous in general. 3

A lowering of the terms of

Wage productivity effects are ambig

One of the special cases under which the above result con

tinues to hold is where the net output of a worker depends on his level of
utility; 4 provided a dollar increase in a worker's income yields less than a
dollar's increase in his net output (which is what we would typically expect).
Open Economy:

Since in an open economy the demand and supply of the rural
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good is balanced by adjusting the externally traded quantities, the terms of
trade and the urban wage can be set independently of one another in an open
economy.

A lowering of the terms of trade, keeping the urban wage fixed (in

terms of the, numeraire, industrial good) increases the investible surplus if
currently the rural good is not being taxed too heavily (that is, the domestic
price of the rural good is not too low compared to its international price), or
if it is being subsidized. 5

This is in part because a typical developing econ

omy is a net exporter of the rural good, and a lower terms of trade implies a
higher tax revenue on exports.

On the other hand, if the current tax on the

rural good is large, then a further reduction in the terms of trade reduces the
investible surplus because the revenue loss from the induced reduction in the
rural surplus is sufficiently large to offset other potential gains.
The assumption that the urban wage would remain unchanged (in terms of any
one of the two goods) is not always compelling.

A useful benchmark case is

that where it adjusts to keep the welfare of the urban worker unchanged.
there exists a critical level of the terms of trade, p*,
international price, such that:

Then,

which is below the

The investible surplus increases (decreases)

with a lowering of the terms of trade if the current terms of trade is above
(below) p*.

Further, since a lower terms of trade hurts rural workers but, by

assumption, leaves the welfare of urban workers unchanged, it follows that:
Any price below p* is Pareto inefficient. 6
II.

Preobrazhensky's Propositions
In this section, we ask, what is the appropriate model to serve as a basis

for examining two propositions of Preobrazhensky:

(i) the state can increase

the accumulation by turning the terms of trade against peasants, and (ii) the
increased accumulation is possible without hurting the industrial workers.

s
If indeed there is a single model which captures the Proebrazhensky's
construct, then it is obvious that both of the commentators can not be right
because they argue in favor of two quite different models; at least one of them
must be wrong.
ved.

We argue below that both of them miss the central issues invol

On the other hand, the divergence of views between the two commentators.

as well as their disagreement with us, can be viewed as a consequence of the
ambiguities in Preobrazhensky's writings; after all, Preobrazhensky was not
only writing a verbal economics tract, but was also fighting a life and death
battle (as subsequent events were to prove) of ideology and polemics.
There is no doubt, however, that the key policy instrument in Preobraz
hensky's scheme of primitive socialist accumulation was the terms of trade
between the agricultural and the industrial goods; although he did mention a
multitude of other instruments such as direct taxation. railway freights, cred
it policy, printing money. etc.

The reason (which holds for many of today's

LDCs as well) is simply that an attempt to alter the terms of trade merely
requires the government to attempt the nominal price of the industrial good;
this change is more feasible than implementing virtually any other policy in
strument.

Basing his conclusions on quotations from Preobrazhensky's writing,

Erlich (1960, pp. 49-50) states this point succinctly "'The concentration of
the whole of the big industries ••• in the hands of the workers' state increases
to an extraordinary extent ••• the possibility of carrying out ••• a price policy
on the basis of monopoly' ••• Preobrazhensky did not, to be sure, renounce direct
taxation as an instrument of the redistribution of income in favor of socialist
industry •••• Taxation through price, however, was in his view the most effective
single device--both because of the 'extreme convenience of collection which did
not require a penny for a special fiscal apparatus' and for reasons of politi-
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cal expediency.n

'The way of direct taxation is the most dangerous way, lead

ing to a break with the peasants.'n
In contrast, a model with urban-rural pricing, which is what Blomqvist
argues for, entails not only large administrative costs but it also requires
the administrative ability (in which the USSR was clearly lacking during 191724) to monitor the ntax bordern between the two sectors.

Therefore, it should

not be surprising that the participants in the Soviet debate as well as those
who have subsequently analyzed this debate have viewed the terms of trade (and
not urban-rural pricing) as the central instrument in Preobrazhensky's scheme.
We may also note here that Blomqvist's use of an urban-rural pricing model to
view some of Michael Lipton's analysis of the Soviet debate might be misleading
because a central instrument in Lipton's analysis (1976, pp. 128-29) is, once
again. the terms of trade.

In another context, Lipton states ''The 'scissors'

discussion always was, and is, mostly about changing the price of the rural
good relative to the urban good-not about changing the relative price paid by
the two sectors for the same goodn [personal communication, 1982, emphasis in
the original].
Next consider Carter's comment concerning external trade.

It is obvious

that what is important is not whether the country trades or not, but whether
the economy can or can not freely increase its trade at the margin.

A look at

the trade figures of the USSR during the relevant period (that is. between the
October Revolution and the beginning of the industrialization debate in 1924}
exhibits an extreme decline compared to pre-World War I period.

The trade was

negligible until 1920; even in 1923, the import volume was less than 11 per
cent. and the export volume was less than 15 percent. of the respective 1913
levels [see Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart (1981, p. 267}].

Though these (or
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any other trade figures) could. in principle. be consistent with a model with

2.£. without constraints on external trade. historical facts suggest the former
model. Not only was the USSR facing blockades by the allies during much of this
period (augmenting the Soviets' fear of "capitalist encirclement") but. even
after the Treaty of Rapallo (April 1922), it was facing significant isolation
in trade and current business credit [see Maurice Dobb (1966. Chapter 7)].
The importance of these constraints is explicit in Preobrazhensky's
views; though he emphasized the potential usefulness of external trade to the
Soviet state, he clearly noted (1979. p. 14)

" ••• all kinds of external

complications that might not only sever our economic ties with the capitalist
countries but will also most effectively retard even that part of socialist
construction that is based on the domestic resources of the Republic." Obvious
ly. a fuller understanding of the implications of trade embargoes and interrup
tions (and of credit constraints) requires an explicit modelling of these phe
In stylized aggregate models such as those being discussed here, how

nomena.

ever. the facts concerning the USSR during 1917-24 (and the understanding that
the participants in Soviet debate had of these facts) suggest that a model with
constraints on external trade is more plausible than the one without any con
straints.
III.

Concluding

Ke■arks

A virtue of developing a general theoretical framework is that it enables
one to isolate the features of the economy which are critical for the issues at
hand.

Can a manipulation of the terms of trade squeeze the agricultural sector

to provide funds for industrial development?

If the economy faces constraints

on external trade and urban wages cannot adjust. the answer is no.

If urban

wages do adjust. the answer is yes. but only if the urban workers are made
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worse off. Further, since wages must adjust more the greater is the sensitivity
of agricultural surplus to the terms of trade; the greater this sensitivity,
the greater is the increase in the investible surplus from turning the terms of
trade against peasants.

If the economy does not face trade constraints. or if

prices in the two sectors can be set independently, then there is no necessary
link between urban wages and the rural prices.

Yet, in these cases. we show

that it is Pareto inefficient to set the relative price of the agricultural
good below some level.

That is, a price squeeze of peasants beyond some point

is counterproductive, regardless of whether the state cares about the welfare
of peasants or not.
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FOOINO'J.'ES

1

see Sah and Stiglitz (1983, 1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1986).

An empirical

framework for analyzing urban-rural pricing issues in a multi-person, multi
commodity context was developed in Sah (1982); such models have been employed
by Avishay Braverman et al. (1984), and others.
2

Proofs of the results described in this section are contained in our 1985a

paper.
3

See our 1985a and 1985c papers for a general (reduced form) representation of

wage productivity effects; special cases of this representation are the hypoth
eses based on labor efficiency, labor quality, and labor turnover.

Carter's

interpretation that our reduced form expression represents a nutrition-based
link between wage and productivity is, thus, unnecessarily restrictive.
4

Carter's specification, in which the net output depends on a particular "real

wage" can be seen as an approximation of this case.

His treatment of this case

(see his equation (15')) is not fully satisfactory, however, because the budget

shares (used in defining the "real wage") remain unaffected even though wage
and prices are changing.

Moreover, his assertion that the result dI/dp

<0

is

a rather special case is ungrounded.
5

carter claims (based on his equation (11')). but does not show, that a squeeze

with price scissors must lower accumulation.

This claim is incorrect.
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Analogous conclusions hold in models with different urban-rural prices.

For

instance, in the model on which Blomqvist's comments are based, one obtains:
dI/dp ( 0 if
that:

(p -

p)/p ( 1/e~.

This, in combination with d~/dp

< 0,

implies

Lowering the rural price below some level is Pareto inefficient.

See

Sah and Stiglitz (1983) for a discussion of this and other related results.
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